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Imagine Mr. Blofeld, a foreign entrepreneur, who discovered the
perfect way to make a fast buck.' He registered the Internet domain
name "pentium3.com" with Verisign, a domain registry based in Vir-
ginia, and then set up a pornographic website at that address. Around
the world, Internet users seeking information on Intel, the manufac-
turer of the Pentium computer processor, were diverted to Blofeld's
site. Blofeld could either continue to profit from the Internet traffic
intended for the Intel website or offer to sell advertising space on his
webpage to Intel's competitors. Even though these activities confused
consumers and tarnished the value of Intel's protected mark, Intel
could do little to stop him. Blofeld had not directly attempted to ex-
tort money from Intel. Since Blofeld's only contact in the United
States was the registration of the domain name with the Virginia regis-
try, he seems beyond the jurisdictional reach of United States courts.
This hypothetical case of cyberpiracy is typical of a problem
known as "cybersquatting." Cybersquatting consists of registering,
trafficking in, or using Internet addresses that are identical or confus-
ingly similar to protected trademarks. Cybersqatters often register
these famous marks as domain names in order to profit from the
mark's goodwill or for the purpose of disparaging the mark.3 They pi-
t B.A. 1998, Washington and Lee University; J.D. Candidate 2003, The University of Chi-
cago.
I These facts are loosely based on an incident described in a Senate Report discussing the
problem of cybersquatting. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, S Rep No 106-140,
106th Cong, 1st Sess 6 (1999).
2 See Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act, HR Rep No 106-412,106th Cong, 1st Sess 8
(1999).
3 See id. Cybersquatters register distinctive marks for various reasons. Anticybersquatting
Act, S Rep No 106-140 at 5-7 (cited in note 1). Some do so in order to extort payment from the
trademark owner, while others register the marks with the hope of selling them to the highest
bidder. See id. Many, however, have motives similar to those of the hypothetical cybersquatter,
1837
1838 The University of Chicago Law Review [69:1837
rate the marks of companies ranging from McDonald's to Warner
Brothers. Some are foreign nationals like Blofeld who have no con-
tacts in the United States beyond domain registration.!
Because cybersquatters often live abroad, an owner of a mark
may have trouble haling someone like Blofeld into a United States
federal court. Most courts hold that domain registration itself does not
establish sufficient contacts with the forum state because most regis-
trants are unaware of, and potentially unable to discover, where their
domain name is registered.! Since a court may only exercise in per-
sonam jurisdiction7 over a defendant when that individual has such
"minimum contacts" with the forum state, courts are unable to assert
in personam jurisdiction over these individuals.
Congress sought to remedy this situation through the Anticyber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).9 The Act grants mark
owners the right to file in rem actions ' against the domain name in the
forum in which the registrar is located so long as the mark owners
Blofeld, mentioned above. They may benefit from the mark's goodwill because the website may
derive advertising revenue from the number of times it is accessed. See id at 6. Cybersquatters
may also register famous marks in order to engage in unfair competition and prey on consumer
confusion. See id. A typical example of this is a cybersquatter who operated a website under the
domain name "disneytransportation.com". See id. The business offered shuttle services in the
Orlando area and reservations at Disney hotels, although the company was in no way affiliated
with the Walt Disney Company and this fact was not indicated on the website. See id.
4 See Anticybersquatting Act, S Rep No 106-140 at 5-6 (cited in note 1).
5 See Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, HR Conf
Rep No 106-464, 106th Cong, 1st Sess 114 (1999) ("In an effort to avoid being held accountable
for their infringement or dilution of famous trademarks, cyberpirates often ... have used off-
shore addresses or companies to register domain names.").
6 See, for example, Cable News Network LP, LLLP v CNNew&com, 162 F Supp 2d 484,
489 n 16 (E D Va 2001) ("It is sensibly settled that these contacts do not provide a constitution-
ally adequate basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction!') (citation omitted); America
Online; Inc v Huang, 106 F Supp 2d 848,856 (E D Va 2000) (holding that entrance into domain
name registration agreements with a Virginia registrar does not amount to minimum contacts
with Virginia for purposes of exercising personal jurisdiction); Banco Inverlat, SA v Inverlatcom,
112 F Supp 2d 521, 522 n 1 (E D Va 2000) (finding that mere registration of a disputed domain
name with Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) in Virginia is insufficient to subject a defendant to per-
sonal jurisdiction); Heathmount AE Corp v Technodomecom, 106 F Supp 2d 860, 866 (E D Va
2000) (emphasizing that because defendants do not purposefully avail themselves of the forum
through mere registration, personal jurisdiction is lacking).
7 In personam jurisdiction, often referred to as personal jurisdiction, describes the power
of a court to bring persons into its adjudicative process. See Black's Law Dictionary 857 (West
7th ed 1999).
8 See International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310,316 (1945) (establishing that courts
may exercise personal jurisdiction when the defendants have "minimum contacts" with the fo-
rum state such that exercise of jurisdiction comports with "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice").
9 Pub L No 106-113,113 Stat 1536 (1999), codified at 15 USC § 1125(d) (2000) (enacted as
Title III of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999).
10 In rem jurisdiction describes the power of a court to adjudicate the rights to a given
piece of property, including the power to seize and hold it. See Black's Law Dictionary 856 (West
7th ed 1999).
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show that a cybersquatter lacks minimum contacts and is not subject
to in personam jurisdiction." Because some courts hold that the mini-
mum contacts standard does not apply to in rem claims filed in the fo-
rum state in which the property is located, plaintiffs can use the ACPA
to obtain relief when the court would otherwise lack in personam
jurisdiction over the property owner."
The exercise of in rem jurisdiction over domain names owned by
foreign defendants, however, presents constitutional problems. In
Shaffer v Heitner,3 the Supreme Court suggested that all exercises of
jurisdiction must satisfy the minimum contacts standard." Shaffer indi-
cates that plaintiffs filing in rem actions must still show that property
owners have established minimum contacts with the forum state.
Shaffer's holding raises doubts as to the validity of the ACPA insofar
as it bars plaintiffs from bringing in rem actions if minimum contacts
exist. Unable to file in rem claims, mark owners may pursue in per-
sonam actions against the cybersquatter. Plaintiffs, however, will face
difficulties when the defendant's only contact with the forum state is
registration. The mechanics of the registration process demonstrate
that registrants do not "purposefully avail" themselves of the benefits
of the forum state, as required by the Court's in personam jurisdiction
holdings.'5
This Comment argues that mark owners may obtain in personam
jurisdiction over foreign cybersquatters through the "effects" doctrine
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). The Supreme Court first
announced the "effects" doctrine in Calder v Jones.16 The doctrine
states that courts may constitutionally exercise in personam jurisdic-
tion when defendants intentionally cause harm within the forum. This
doctrine may be combined with Rule 4(k)(2), which allows federal
courts to aggregate contacts over the entire country when considering
whether the court has jurisdiction, in order to hear a cybersquatting
case." When cybersquatters, like Blofeld, register trademark-infringing
11 See 15 USC § 1125(d)(2).
12 See, for example, Cable News Network, 162 F Supp 2d at 491-92 (holding that in an
ACPA in rem action it is not necessary that the allegedly infringing registrant have minimum
contacts with the forum so long as the registry is located there).
13 433 US 186 (1977).
14 See id at 212 ("[A]ll assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to
the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.").
15 See Part II.C.
16 465 US 783 (1984) (finding personal jurisdiction proper when the defendant expressly
aimed tortious conduct at the forum state although he himself was not actually present in the fo-
rum).
17 Fed R Civ P 4(k)(2) specifically provides:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, with respect to
claims arising under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any
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domain names and engage in activities that tarnish the value of the
mark, they intentionally injure mark owners in the United States. Cy-
bersquatters establish minimum contacts with the nation as a whole
because mark owners suffer harm in the United States. Based on these
nationwide contacts, federal courts may exercise in personam jurisdic-
tion under Rule 4(k)(2).
This Comment is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the me-
chanics of domain name registration, how the ACPA operates, and the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on in personam and in rem jurisdic-
tion. Part II illustrates why the ACPA's in rem provision is of ques-
tionable value to plaintiffs. It begins with an examination of the divi-
sion among courts over whether mark owners filing in rem claims un-
der the Act must also establish that the domain owner has minimum
contacts with the forum. It concludes by demonstrating why ACPA
claims must satisfy the minimum contacts test and why mere registra-
tion is insufficient to establish such contacts with the forum state. Fi-
nally, Part III illustrates how mark owners may achieve greater success
using the "effects" doctrine and Rule 4(k)(2) to file in personam
claims against foreign cybersquatters.
I. THE ACPA AND IN REM AND IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
The growth of the Internet has led to an increase in the value of
trademarks.' Businesses use their marks as domain names to attract
consumers to their websites. The increase in value and usage of pro-
tected marks on the Internet has led to a corresponding increase in
cybersquatting. '9 Congress responded by providing mark owners with
a civil remedy through the ACPA. The ability of mark owners to ob-
tain the relief provided by the ACPA depends, however, on whether a
court may assert in personam jurisdiction over the cybersquatter or in
rem jurisdiction over the offending domain name."
defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any
state.
18 See Part I.A. See generally, HR Rep 106-412 at 5 (cited in note 2); Panavision Interna-
tional, LP v Toeppen, 945 F Supp 1296, 1299 (C D Cal 1996), affd, 141 F3d 1316 (9th Cir 1998)
(noting that Internet consumers frequently search for businesses' websites under their trade-
marks).
19 See generally, HR Rep 106-412 at 5-6 (cited in note 2); Paul Farhi, A Web 'Squatter'
Beats Exxon Mobil to Its Site, Wash Post El (Dec 3,1998).
20 See Part I.C.
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A. The Internet and Domain Names
Businesses maintain Internet websites to provide information,
products, and services to consumers and other businesses. 2' These
companies increase their visibility by registering unique domain
names to identify their websites.n In order to connect with Internet
users, businesses frequently register their trademarks as domain
names.23 For example, a consumer interested in Nike shoes may easily
guess that Nike's website address is "nike.com." If a user cannot guess
the domain name, however, the user must search for the site using an
Internet search engine, such as Google, to search for keywords likely
to appear on the website.24 Since these searches often yield thousands
of matches, users may experience difficulty finding the website.2 Busi-
nesses thus have a strong interest in using personalized, easily identifi-
able marks as domain names.26
Between 1992 and 1998, Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), a Vir-
ginia-based company, served as the exclusive registrar and registry for
the domain name system.n Registration occurred online, took only a
matter of minutes, and took place on a first-come, first-served basis.2
Registrants needed only to provide the name or organization using
21 See Panavision International, LP v Toeppen, 945 F Supp 1296,1299 (C D Cal 1996), affd,
141 F3d 1316 (9th Cir 1998) ("[B]usinesses have begun to use the Internet to provide informa-
tion and products to consumers and other businesses.").
22 Every website has a unique numerical address, referred to as an Internet Protocol (IP)
address. See id. Each IP address, which is often long and difficult to remember, corresponds to a
more user-friendly alphanumeric address known as a domain name. See Thomas R. Lee, In Rem
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 Wash L Rev 97,100 (2000). Domain names are the familiar ".com"
and ".edu" addresses commonly seen on the Internet. See Panavision, 945 F Supp at 1299 (noting
that ".com" is commonly used by commercial entities and ".edu" by educational entities). They
identify the entity maintaining the website and enable users to locate websites more quickly and
easily. See id.
23 See Panavision, 945 F Supp at 1299 ("Because users ... may not be able to access web-
sites at all when they do not know (or cannot deduce) the proper domain name, businesses fre-
quently register their names and trademarks as domain names.').
24 See id (discussing search engines). See also <http://www.googie.com> (visited Oct 5,
2002).
25 See Panavision, 945 F Supp at 1299 (noting that a key word search frequently yields
thousands of websites).
26 See id (noting that businesses frequently use known or deducible domain names to fa-
cilitate consumers' ability to locate their web pages).
27 See National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Management of
Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed Reg 31,741-42 (1998). The functions of a registry are dis-
tinct from that of a registrar. See Cable News Network LP, LLLP v CNNews.com, 162 F Supp 2d
484,486 n 4 (E D Va 2001) (distinguishing a registrar from a registry). A registrar is simply one of
several entities authorized to grant registrations of domain names. See id. A registry, however, is
the only entity that maintains all official records regarding registrations in a top level domain
such as ".corn" or ".edu". See id.
28 See Lee, 75 Wash L Rev at 102-03 (cited in note 22) ("The process of registering a do-
main name through NSI is inexpensive, potentially anonymous and virtually instantaneous and
that NSI distributes domain name registrations on a first-come, first-served basis.").
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the domain name and contact information.2 NSI charged a small, an-
nual fee to maintain the domain name in its directory and link the
domain name with its corresponding IP address.2M NSI did not screen
domain name applications to determine if individuals were registering
protected marks as domain names.
Today, users may register with any number of registrars over the
Internet.3 The method of registration described above, however, re-
mains unchanged.33 NSI, recently acquired by Verisign Global Registry
Services, continues to serve as the largest registrar and registry for
domain names registered by American businesses."
B. The ACPA
The ACPA provides mark owners with a remedy against the type
of trademark piracy described above.35 The Act holds liable individuals
who act in bad faith in registering or trafficking in domain names that
are "identical or confusingly similar" to protected marks.m' Mark own-
ers proceeding in personam against cybersquatters may seek both le-
gal and equitable remedies.37
In enacting the ACPA, Congress recognized that many foreign
cybersquatters do not have minimum contacts with any one state and
were thus successfully able to avoid the reach of United States courts
on jurisdictional grounds. ' To account for cybersquatters like Blofeld,
over whom the court may not exercise in personam jurisdiction, the
ACPA includes an in rem provision that allows mark owners to file
29 See id at 102-03.
30 See America Online Inc v Huang, 106 F Supp 2d 848, 850 (E D Va 2000) (noting that
domain names can now be secured from a registry for $35 per year or less); Ariana E. Cha, Seven
New Domain Suffixes Approved; Expanded List Widens Online Possibilities, Wash Post El (Nov
17,2000) (same).
31 See America Online, 106 F Supp 2d at 853.
32 For a list of registrars from around the world, see ICANN-Accredited Registrars, avail-
able at <http:lwww.icann.orglregistrars/accredited-lst.html> (visited May 16,2002).
33 See, for example, Network Solutions, available online at <http://www.netsol.com> (vis-
ited May 16, 2002); Alldomainscom, available online at <http://www.aldomains.com> (visited
May 16, 2002).
34 See About Verisign, available online at <http://corporate.verisign.comlnews/fact.html>
(visited May 16,2002). Verisign serves as the exclusive registry for the ".com" domains. See id.
35 See ACPA § 3002,113 Stat at 1536.
36 15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(A). Courts may consider a variety of factors in determining
whether a defendant has acted in bad faith, including whether the registrant attempted to extort
payment from the mark owner or intended to divert consumers from the mark owner's online
location to his own web page. See 15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(B).
37 See 15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(C)-(D).
38 Congress drafted the ACPA's in rem provision with two types of defendants in mind: in-
dividuals who preserved their anonymity by providing false contact information to the registrar,
and foreigners with few contacts in the United States. See HR Rep No 106-412 at 14 (cited in
note 2). This Comment focuses on the ability of courts to obtain jurisdiction over the latter group
of defendants.
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claims directly against the infringing domain names in the judicial dis-
trict in which the domain name registry, registrar, or domain name au-
thority is located.3 Before filing such claims, however, owners must
show either that defendants are not subject to in personam jurisdic-
tion or that they cannot identify the proper defendants.4' Relief under
the in rem provision is also limited to cancellation of the domain
name or transfer to the plaintiff.
2
C. General Jurisprudence on In Personam and In Rem Jurisdiction
The ability of mark owners to obtain relief under the ACPA de-
pends on whether courts may assert in personam jurisdiction over the
cybersquatters or in rem jurisdiction over the offending domain
names. In a series of decisions since 1945, the Supreme Court has dic-
tated the constitutional requirements for the exercise of jurisdiction.
1. Territorialism and the distinction between in personam and in
rem jurisdiction.
Through the first half of the twentieth century, the principles of
territoriality articulated in Pennoyer v Neff4 3 defined jurisdictional
boundaries. Throughout this period, courts could exercise jurisdiction
only over persons and property located within their own territory."
Three types of judicial action emerged from Pennoyer. Courts can ex-
ercise: (1) in personam jurisdiction over an individual in an action de-
termining the "rights and obligations of the defendant;" (2) in rem, or
"true" in rem, jurisdiction over property in a proceeding to determine
the rights of all to the property; and (3) quasi in rem jurisdiction over
property in an action to determine the rights of specified claimants to
a thing.'5 In rem actions may be further distinguished from quasi in
rem actions. In rem actions involve claims between parties to property
located in the forum state and on which the jurisdiction of the court is
based.4' Quasi in rem claims differ in that the property does not give
39 See 15 USC § 1125(d)(2).
40 See 15 USC § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
41 See 15 USC § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
42 See 15 USC § 1125(d)(2)(D).
43 95 US 714 (1877) (holding that no state may exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
over property outside of its territory).
44 See id at 722 (noting that each state's laws have "no operation outside its territory ex-
cept so far as is allowed by comity").
45 See id at 727; Linda I Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 NYU L Rev
33,39 (1978) (stating that the Pennoyer Court identified three categories of jurisdiction).
46 See Jack H. Friedenthal, Mary Kay Kane, and Arthur R. Miller, Civil Procedure 98 (West
3d ed 1999); Fleming James, Jr., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and John Leubsdort Civil Procedure 22-
24 (Foundation 4th ed 1992).
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rise to the underlying cause of action.47 The plaintiff's claim, possibly in
tort or contract, is unrelated to the property located in the forum
state.' The court attaches this property, however, as a basis for exercis-
ing jurisdiction over a defendant who otherwise would not be subject
to in personam jurisdiction for the plaintiff's claim.49 Actions under the
in rem provision of the ACPA are typically characterized as true in
rem actions because the mark owner's claim is based on his purported
right to the domain address "housed" in the forum."
2. The exercise of in personam jurisdiction after
International Shoe.
In personam jurisdictional analysis shifted dramatically with the
Supreme Court's ruling in International Shoe v Washington." Under
International Shoe, courts can assert jurisdiction over defendants if: (1)
defendants have minimum contacts with the forum state; and (2) the
exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, comporting with "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice.'' 2
Minimum contacts and reasonableness now dictate the jurisdic-
tional reach of courts. An individual establishes minimum contacts
when he "purposefully avails" himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum, thus invoking the "benefits and protections
of its laws."5 3 Defendants' connection with the forum must be such that
47 See James Win. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, § 108.7012] at 107 (3d ed 2002) (stating
that type II quasi in rem actions occur when the plaintiff asserts another claim against the defen-
dant and seeks to establish an interest in the defendant's property as a basis for exercising juris-
diction). Quasi in rem jurisdiction is often divided into two categories, type I and type II. See id
at 106-08. Type I quasi in rem actions, like in rem actions, involve claims between parties to
property that serve as the basis for jurisdiction. See James, Hazard, and Leubsdorf Civil Proce-
dure at 66 (cited in note 46); Silberman, 53 NYU L Rev at 39 (cited in note 45). Type II quasi in
rem actions concern a claim that does not relate to the property. Through attachment, property
owned by the defendant is seized at the beginning of the action and held with a view of giving it
to the plaintiff if the claim against the defendant is sustained on the merits. See James, Hazard,
and Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure at 66 (cited in note 46). In practice, there is no real difference be-
tween a true in rem action and a type I quasi in rem action. See Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cy-
berspace, 75 Wash L Rev at 112 (cited in note 22) (noting that the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws abandons entirely the distinction between the two). For the purposes of this Com-
ment, I will thus treat quasi in rem actions as possessing the characteristics of type II quasi in
rem claims and will consider type I quasi in rem and true in rem actions to be the same.
48 See Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, § 108.70[2] at 107 (cited in note 47).
49 See id.
50 See generally Cable News Network LP, LLLP v CNNews.com, 162 F Supp 2d 484,490
(E D Va 2001) ("ACPA in rem actions ... are of the 'true in rem' genre because they involve the
rights of a disputed mark for every potential rights holder."). Theoretically, in rem claims filed
under the ACPA may also be characterized as type I quasi in rem actions since there is no practi-
cal difference between the two types of jurisdiction. See note 47.
51 326 US 310 (1945).
52 Id at 316 (quotations omitted).
53 Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235,253 (1958).
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they should "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in that
state.-
In assessing reasonableness, courts engage in a balancing test and
consider a variety of factors including: (1) the interests of the forum
state; (2) the plaintiff's interests in obtaining relief; and (3) the bur-
dens placed on the defendant." Courts may presume that an exercise
of jurisdiction is reasonable when defendants purposefully direct their
activities at forum residents. In such cases, defendants have the burden
of proof and must present a "compelling case" that jurisdiction is un-
reasonable." The reasonableness prong of International Shoe takes on
greater significance when plaintiffs face overseas defendants like for-
eign cybersquatters. In Asahi Metal Industry Co, Ltd v Superior Court
of California,n the Supreme Court dismissed an indemnity action in
California between a Japanese corporation and a Taiwanese manufac-
turer.' The Court found that the exercise of jurisdiction over the claim
was unreasonable since the heavy burdens placed on the Taiwanese
defendant in travel expenses outweighed any interest California or the
Japanese business had in litigating in California.
3. In rem jurisdiction after International Shoe.
The scope of the International Shoe standard is not limited to ex-
ercises of in personam jurisdiction. In Shaffer, the Supreme Court
suggested that minimum contacts rules apply to all assertions of juris-
diction. & Shaffer involved a Delaware state court's exercise of quasi in
rem jurisdiction in a shareholder derivative suit against a group of
nonresident defendants.1 The state court could not assert in personam
jurisdiction over the defendants since they lacked minimum contacts
with Delaware. 2 Instead, the court exercised quasi in rem jurisdiction
54 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286,297 (1980).
55 See Asahi Metal Industry Co, Ltd v Superior Court of California, 480 US 102,113 (1987).
Other factors are "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolu-
tion of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental sub-
stantive social politics." Id, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at 292.
56 Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462,477 (1984) ("Where a defendant who pur-
posefully has directed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must pre-
sent a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable.").
57 480 US 102 (1987).
58 Id at 105-06,108.
59 See id at 114 (noting also the "unique burdens placed on one who must defend oneself
in a foreign legal system").
60 See 433 US at 212.
61 See id at 193 (noting that the Delaware court stated that the primary purpose of the se-
questration was "to compel the personal appearance of a nonresident defendant").
62 See id at 213 (recognizing that the plaintiff "did not allege and does not now claim that
[defendants] have ever set foot in Delaware").
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over the nonresident defendants by the sequestering of the defen-
dants' stock in a Delaware corporation.?
The Supreme Court ruled that the Delaware court could exercise
jurisdiction only if the defendants had minimum contacts with the fo-
rum.6 In broad terms, the Court held that "all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny.' The Court found that the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over property was in fact an assertion of jurisdic-
tion over the owner of the property and must be judged under the
minimum contacts standard.? In dicta, the Court suggested that it in-
tended its holding to apply to quasi in rem claims and also to "true" in
rem actions, such as those filed under the ACPA, in which the action
arises from direct claims to property located in the forum.? The Court
analyzed the impact of the minimum contacts test on in rem claims
and noted that in these cases, "the presence of property in a state may
bear on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the
forum State, the defendant, and the litigation."'6
4. The "effects" doctrine and minimum contacts.
The Supreme Court has expanded the ways in which defendants
may establish minimum contacts sufficient for the exercise of in per-
sonam jurisdiction.69 Defendants who aim tortious conduct at forum
residents may establish minimum contacts.? In Calder, for example,
the Supreme Court held that a Florida reporter and his editor could
be subject to jurisdiction in California after the reporter wrote an al-
legedly libelous story attacking a California resident.7' Even though
the defendants authored and edited the story in Florida, the Court
found California to be the focal point of both the story and the harm
63 See id at 194 (stating that the Delaware court held that "the statutory Delaware situs of
the stock provided a sufficient basis for the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction by a Delaware
court").
64 Id at 216-17.
65 Id at 212.
66 See id ("The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an as-
sertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without substan-
tial modem justification.").
67 See id at 207 ("The standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over
the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts stan-
dard elucidated in International Shoe.').
68 Id.
69 See, for example, Calder v Jones, 465 US 783, 791 (1984) (finding that a Florida defen-
dant possessed sufficient contacts with California because conduct consisted of "intentional con-
duct in Florida calculated to cause injury to respondent in California").
70 See id at 789-90.
71 Id at 788.
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suffered.? Under Calder's "effects" test, a defendant who has never
entered the forum state can nevertheless be subject to jurisdiction if
the defendant: (1) commits an intentional act expressly aimed at the
forum; and (2) that act causes harm that (a) is felt primarily in the fo-
rum and (b) the defendant knew would be felt in the forum.?
Courts have employed the "effects" doctrine to assert in per-
sonam jurisdiction over cybersquatters engaged in extortion.74 In
Panavision International, LP v Toeppen," a case decided before the
enactment of the ACPA, the plaintiff filed claims against the cyber-
squatter under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.76 This
provision, unlike the ACPA, does not hold individuals liable for the
mere registration of marks that are identical or confusingly similar to
protected marks." In Panavision, the Ninth Circuit held that an Illinois
defendant established minimum contacts with the forum state after
registering a California company's trademark and then attempting to
extort money from that business in California.? The defendant estab-
lished minimum contacts because he sent demands for payment to
Panavision in California and he was aware that his conduct would
have the effect of injuring that business in the forum state.7 In Mac-
Connell v Schwamm,8 a federal district court similarly held that a cy-
bersquatter residing in Japan established minimum contacts in Cali-
fornia after attempting to extort money from a California business.8'
The court found jurisdiction proper under Panavision because the de-
fendant had sent emails demanding payment to the mark owner in
California.? No court has applied the effects doctrine to assert in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a cybersquatter, such as Blofeld, who registers
72 See id at 789 (noting that the plaintiff suffered the brunt of the harm, both in terms of
her emotional distress and injury to her professional reputation, in California).
73 See id (holding that since California was the focal point of the harm suffered, jurisdic-
tion was "proper in California based on the 'effects' of [the defendants' intentional] Florida con-
duct in California").
74 See Panavision Internationa4 LP v Toeppen, 141 F3d 1316,1322 (9th Cir 1998) (holding
an Illinois defendant subject to in personam jurisdiction in California under the "effects test"
when he registered a California plaintiffs trademark as a domain name and attempted to extort
money from the plaintiff); MacConnell v Schwamm, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 13850, *9-13 (S D Cal
2000) (holding that jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant where registration of a do-
main name amounts to tortious conduct aimed at forum residents as part of a scheme to extort
money).
75 141 F3d 1316.
76 15 USC § 1125(c). Panavision, 141 F3d at 1319.
77 See 15 USC § 1125(c).
78 See 141 F3d at 1322.
79 See id at 1319,1322.
80 2000 US Dist LEXIS 12850 (S D Cal 2000).
81 See MacConnell, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 13850 at *10. The defendant did not, however,
claim to be a citizen of Japan. Id at *18. He also allegedly had substantial contacts with Califor-
nia, where he owned property, paid taxes, and maintained a mailing address. Id at *7.
82 Id at*34,*11-12.
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a protected mark with a bad faith intent to profit from or disparage
the mark but who does not attempt to extort the mark owner.
5. Rule 4(k)(2) and minimum contacts.
Federal courts may exercise in personam jurisdiction oyer foreign
defendants based on their contacts with the nation as a whole if the
underlying statute authorizes nationwide service of processY Even if
the federal statute does not authorize nationwide service, federal
courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants who
have ample contacts with the nation as a whole, but whose contacts
are so scattered that no one state could exercise personal jurisdiction!'
83 Panavision and MacConnell both suggest that plaintiffs may not establish in personam
jurisdiction over a cybersquatter by pointing solely to the defendant's registration of a trade-
mark-infringing domain name. See Panavision, 141 F3d at 1322; MacConnell, 2000 US Dist
LEXIS 13850 at *10. The Ninth Circuit argued that "something more" was needed to demon-
strate that the defendant directed his activity toward the forum and sought to harm the mark
owner. Panavision, 141 F3d at 1322. Each court found this requirement satisfied based on the de-
fendant's intent to harm the mark owner through an extortionist scheme. A plaintiff should also,
however, be able to fulfill this requirement by simply showing that the cybersquatter acted with
the bad faith intent to harm the mark owner. Cybersquatters who register domain names with
the intent of diverting customers to their sites or for the purposes of disparaging the mark simi-
larly seek to harm the mark owner in the forum. when viewed in this light, the requirement of
"something more" may be seen as an attempt by the Ninth Circuit to require that plaintiffs dem-
onstrate that the defendants did not register the domain name in good faith for legitimate busi-
ness reasons. Neither of these courts directly examined the provisions of the ACPA-Panavision
was decided two years before passage of the Act and MacConnell simply applied Panavision's
holding. If these courts had examined the ACPA, they would have noted that the Act contains a
similar requirement. Plaintiffs filing in personam claims under the ACPA already must demon-
strate that the registrant acted with bad faith intent. 15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(A).
84 See Sheet Metal Workers' National Pension Fund v Elite Erectors, Inc, 212 F3d 1031,
1035-36 (7th Cir 2000) (stating that nationwide service under federal statutes is proper as long as
defendants have adequate contacts with the United States as a whole); United Rope Distributors
Inc v Seatriumph Marine Corp, 930 F2d 532,534 (7th Cir 1991) ("When a national court applies
national law, the due process clause requires only that the defendant possess sufficient contacts
with the United States."). But see Peay v Bell South MedicalAssistance Plan, 205 F3d 1206 (10th
Cir 2000) (examining defendant's contacts with the forum state in a suit when the statute pro-
vided for nationwide service of process). The Supreme Court has yet to rule expressly on the suf-
ficiency of nationwide contacts as a basis for jurisdiction. See Omni Capital International v Ru-
dolf Wolff & Company, 484 US 97,102-03 n 5 (1987) (noting that the issue of whether the Due
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment would be satisfied by aggregating nationwide contacts
was not before the Court). Nevertheless, in Republic of Argentina v Weltover, Inc, 504 US 607
(1992), the Court seemed to endorse a "national contacts" test when it held that the defendant
was subject to personal jurisdiction since it had "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the United States" Id at 620 (quotation omitted). It has been argued,
however, that this ruling does not amount to an endorsement since jurisdiction was asserted in a
federal district where the defendant clearly had contacts. See Leslie M. Kelleher, The December
1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-A CriticalAnalysis, 12 Touro L Rev 7,
49 (1995) (observing that the Republic of Argentina had contacts in New York sufficient to es-
tablish jurisdiction in the district court there without regard to nationwide contacts).
85 See, for example, 1S1 International, Inc v Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 256 F3d 548,551
(7th Cir 2001) (exercising jurisdiction over a foreign defendant under Rule 4(k)(2) based on the
fact the defendant sent letters to California, engaged a law firm in Michigan, and filed for a pat-
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These courts rely on FRCP 4(k)(2), which grants federal courts the
statutory authority to exercise in personam jurisdiction when: (1) a
federal claim is asserted; (2) the defendant has contacts with the na-
tion as a whole; and (3) the defendant is not subject to personal juris-
diction in any particular state.6
Rule 4(k)(2) was intended to fill in a gap in the enforcement of
federal laws. Prior to the rule's enactment, when a claim arose under a
federal statute that did not provide a mechanism for nationwide ser-
vice of process,'? the district court could only assert in personam juris-
diction if the defendant had established minimum contacts with the
state in which the court sat.' Foreign defendants often evaded federal
jurisdiction since they lacked sufficient contacts with any one state.89
Courts now use Rule 4(k)(2) to enforce claims arising under federal
statutes that do not contain nationwide service of process provisions.
Since the ACPA lacks a service provision for in personam claims,9
plaintiffs may rely on Rule 4(k)(2) as a statutory source of jurisdic-
tion. The rule enables mark owners to assert in personam claims
against foreign cybersquatters who, while lacking minimum contacts
with any one state, have sufficient contacts with the nation as a whole.
In summary, businesses register their protected marks as domain
names in order to attract consumers. The ACPA grants these owners
the right to file in personam actions against cybersquatters or in rem
claims against domain names that infringe on trademarks. Courts may
assert in personam jurisdiction over cybersquatters if they have mini-
mum contacts with the forum and if this exercise of jurisdiction is rea-
sonable. Shaffer also may require that mark owners seeking to estab-
lish in rem jurisdiction over infringing domain names demonstrate
that the domain owner has minimum contacts with the forum. Plain-
ent in the United States).
86 See United States v Swiss American Bank, 191 F3d 30 (1st Cir 1999).
87 See, for example, Commodity Exchange Act, 42 Stat 988, as amended, 7 USC § 1, et seq
(1982 & Supp IV), cited in Omni Capital, 484 US at 100.
88 See Swiss American, 191 F3d at 36 ("A court need not even consider [constitutional
problems] unless it possess statutory authorization to exercise specific personal jurisdiction.").
s9 See, for example, Omni Capital, 484 US at 101-02 (holding that jurisdiction could not be
exercised over an English defendant in the absence of a jurisdictional statute despite the fact the
defendant had contacts spread across the United States).
90 The ACPA was enacted as an amendment to the Federal Trademark Act of 1946
("Lanham Act"), Pub L No 107-200,60 Stat 441, codified at 15 USC § 1125(a)(1) (1994). For the
amendment to the Lanham Act, see ACPA, S 1948,106th Cong § 3002 (1999). Neither the ACPA
nor the Lanham Act contains provisions authorizing service of process on defendants for in per-
sonam actions. The ACPA does, however, contain such a provision for in rem actions. Plaintiffs
filing in rem claims may obtain service of process over defendants by sending notice of the al-
leged violation and intent to proceed to the registrant, and by publishing notice of the action as
directed by the court. See 15 USC § 1125(d)(2)(B). Plaintiffs may still rely on Rule 4(k)(2) when
filing in personam claims because there is not a corresponding ACPA provision for service for in
personam actions.
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tiffs seeking to assert in personam jurisdiction over the cybersquatter,
however, may seek to do so under the "effects" doctrine if the defen-
dant has directed harmful effects into the forum. Courts, through Rule
4(k)(2), also may exercise in personam jurisdiction over foreign cyber-
squatters on the basis of contacts they establish with the nation as a
whole.
II. APPLICATION OF THE ACPA
The scope of Shaffer's holding has sparked debate. Most com-
mentators contend that minimum contacts rules now apply uniformly
to both in rem and quasi in rem actions,9' and most circuit courts agree
with this interpretation.9 A few commentators suggest, however, that
Shaffer's mandate does not apply to in rem actions, such as those
brought under the ACPA. They insist that since this type of claim was
not directly at issue before the Court, Shaffer's holding is limited to
quasi in rem actions.
The debate over Shaffer impacts the ability of mark owners to
obtain relief when victimized by overseas cybersquatters. Most foreign
cybersquatters-except those who have actively attempted to extort
money from the mark owner-lack minimum contacts with any one
state and thus do not appear to be subject to in personam jurisdiction.
Most mark owners facing such defendants therefore seek relief
through ACPA in rem claims filed in the forum in which the domain
authority is located. Courts are divided, however, over whether
Shaffer mandates that these plaintiffs demonstrate that the mark
owners have minimum contacts with the forum.
Part A will examine the division among courts over whether
minimum contacts analysis applies to ACPA in rem actions. Part B will
show that attempts to limit Shaffer's holding to quasi in rem claims di-
91 See, for example, Silberman, 53 NYU L Rev at 71 (cited in note 45) (stating that Shaffer
"erect[s] a new test against which all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be measured").
92 See, for example, Applewhite v Metro Aviation, Inc, 875 F2d 491,495 (5th Cir 1989) (stat-
ing that "whether the action is instituted in personam, quasi in rem or otherwise" it must be
measured under the International Shoe standard); Pittsburgh Terminal Corp v Mid Allegheny
Corp, 831 F2d 522,526 (4th Cir 1987) ("The narrow holding of [Shaffer] was a simple one: the
minimum contacts rule of International Shoe would henceforth be applied to actions in rem and
quasi in rem, as well as to actions in personam."); Nehemiah v Athletics Congress of USA, 765
F2d 42,47 (3d Cir 1985) (emphasizing that Shaffer "required that the minimum contacts test be
used to evaluate the existence of all claims of in rem jurisdiction"); Burger King Corp v Mac-
shara, 724 F2d 1505, 1510 (11th Cir 1984) (noting that Shaffer abandoned traditional in rem ju-
risdictional analysis in favor of the minimum contacts test), revd on other grounds, 471 US 462
(1985); Lindsey v Greene, 649 F2d 425,427 (6th Cir 1981) (noting that the Supreme Court has ef-
fectively erased any distinctions between in rem and in personam jurisdiction); Lakeside Bridge
& Steel Co v Mountain State Construction Co, 597 F2d 596,600 (7th Cir 1979) (stressing that in
Shaffer, "the principles of International Shoe were held to govern assertion by a state of in rem as
well as in personam jurisdiction").
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rectly contradict language in the opinion and subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, and that plaintiffs in ACPA in rem claims thus must
satisfy the minimum contacts standard. Part C demonstrates why
plaintiffs will find it difficult to prove minimum contacts if a foreign
cybersquatter's only contact with the forum is the mere registration of
the domain name.
A. The Debate over Shaffer
Courts are split over whether Shaffer's holding applies to in rem
claims filed under the ACPA. Several courts require ACPA in rem
plaintiffs to demonstrate that mark owners have minimum contacts
with the forum.3 While only the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction
was at issue in Shaffer, these courts stress that the logic of the Su-
preme Court's opinion extends further.9' Shaffer rejected the legal fic-
tion that in rem proceedings affected only the disposition of property
and not the interests of the property owner.9 Since the exercise of ju-
risdiction over property determines the defendant's property interest
and can thus be viewed as an assertion of jurisdiction over the defen-
dant owner, courts may exercise in rem jurisdiction only when "the
Due Process Clause would have permitted in personam jurisdiction
over those who have an interest in the res." Plaintiffs thus must show
that defendants have minimum contacts with the forum.7 While the
Supreme Court recognized that this standard is usually satisfied in in
rem claims in which the property at issue is located in the forum, it
expressly noted that in some cases the mere presence of the defen-
dant's property would not establish minimum contacts.9
93 See FleetBoston Financial Corp v FleetbostonfinanciaLcom, 138 F Supp 2d 121, 134 (D
Mass 2001) (stating that the efforts to narrow Shaffer are not consistent with the holding of the
case); Porsche Cars North America, Inc v Porsch.com, 51 F Supp 2d 707, 712 (E D Va 1999)
(holding that courts cannot exercise in rem jurisdiction unless the property owner is subject to in
personam jurisdiction in the forum), vacd on other grounds and remd, Porsche Cars North Amer-
ica, Inc v Allporshecom, 215 F3d 1320 (4th Cir 2000). Porsche predated enactment of the ACPA
and the plaintiff filed its claim under the Lanham Act before it was amended to include the
ACPA. While the court did not specifically address the ACPA, its interpretation of Shaffer re-
mains applicable.
94 See FleetBoston, 138 F Supp 2d at 133 (noting that the effort to narrow Shaffer's holding
"does not appear altogether consistent with the reasoning of the Shaffer opinion or subsequent
Supreme Court precedent").
95 See, for example, Porsche, 51 F Supp 2d at 712 (recognizing that "in rem proceedings ...
necessarily affect the interests of persons as well").
96 Id.
97 See id.
98 See Shaffer, 433 US at 208 n 25 (noting that sometimes the presence of property in a
state does not indicate an expectation to benefit from the state's protection). While these courts
agree that plaintiffs must establish minimum contacts, they differ over how this standard may be
satisfied. After dismissing the case on other grounds, the court in FleetBoston noted in dicta that
defendants may establish minimum contacts by simply registering the domain name with a regis-
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Numerous other courts reject this broad interpretation of Shaffer
and hold that minimum contacts analysis does not apply in ACPA in
rem actions." These courts begin by classifying ACPA in rem claims as
"true" quasi in rem actions.'0 In an ACPA in rem claim, a plaintiff as-
serts a direct right to a domain name controlled by a registrar or regis-
try located in the forum. These are "true" in rem actions since the
claim is "directly against the property, with the narrow purpose to ad-
judicate the ownership of that property against the claims of all per-
sons."'0' Shaffer, however, involved a quasi in rem action since the
stock certificates seized as the basis for exercising jurisdiction were
unrelated to the plaintiff's claim. The holding that minimum contacts
analysis applies to all assertions of in rem jurisdiction was, these courts
argue, "non-binding dicta" in so far as it applied to "true" in rem ac-
tions not then before the court.0 The principles of territorialism per-
mitted a court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction over property located
in the forum without regard to any other constitutional require-
ments."0
B. Mark Owners Must Show Minimum Contacts
While courts are correct that much of the language in Shaffer is
dicta, the Shaffer opinion demonstrates that the Supreme Court in-
try located in the forum. See 138 F Supp 2d at 135. In Porsche, the court suggested that registra-
tion alone was not enough. See 51 F Supp 2d at 712-13. The court refused to exercise jurisdiction
"merely because NSI maintains the underlying [domain name] registration certificates within
this district." Id at 712.
99 See Cable News Network LP, LLLP v CNNews.com, 162 F Supp 2d 484, 491 (E D Va
2001) (siding with courts that limit Shaffer to only type II quasi in rem cases); Caesars World, Inc
v Caesars-Palacecom (1), 112 F Supp 2d 502,504 (E D Va 2000) ("[U]nder Shaffer, there must be
minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction only in those in rem proceedings where the
underlying cause of action is unrelated to the property which is located in the forum state:');
HeathmountAE Corp v Technodome.com, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 20316, *7 (E D Va 2000) (noting
that Shaffer did not purport to address purely in rem actions).
100 See, for example, Caesar (I), 112 F Supp 2d at 502 (finding that the domain name is the
"entire subject matter" of the cause of action).
101 Caesars World, Inc v Caesars-palace-com (II), 112 F Supp 2d 505,508 (ED Va 2000).
102 See 433 US at 193.
103 See, for example, Cable News Network, 162 F Supp at 491. The ACPA's structure and leg-
islative history suggest that Congress similarly believes that Shaffer's scope is limited. A Confer-
ence Committee Report accompanying the bill stresses that Shaffer only calls into question the
viability of quasi in rem jurisdiction. See Intellectual Property Communications Omnibus Re-
form Act of 1999, HR Rep No 106-464, 106th Cong, 1st Sess 113-14 (1999). The report further
contends that Shaffer reaffirms the "propriety of in rem proceedings ... where 'claims to the
property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant."' Id. The text and structure of the ACPA confirm Congress's belief The Act only permits
plaintiffs to bring in rem actions if they are unable to show minimum contacts for the purpose of
obtaining in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. See 15 USC § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii).This con-
firms that Congress believes that minimum contacts standards do not apply to the exercise of in
rem jurisdiction.
104 See generally Pennoyer, 95 US at 727.
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tended to require that the minimum contacts analysis apply univer-
sally to all assertions of jurisdiction. Subsequent opinions by the Court
demonstrate the validity of the broad interpretation of Shaffer's hold-
ing. The ACPA in rem provision, which bars plaintiffs from bringing in
rem claims if minimum contacts exist, ' is thus likely nullified because
Shaffer requires that plaintiffs establish minimum contacts in all in
rem actions.
The Supreme Court in Shaffer rejected the traditional conception
of in rem jurisdiction that enabled courts to assert jurisdiction over
property merely because it was found in the forum. The Court ended
formalist distinctions between in rem and in personam actions by em-
phasizing that the exercise of jurisdiction over property necessarily in-
volves the exercise of jurisdiction over the property owner.' Once
these distinctions are abandoned, there is no support for the claim
that the territorial conception of in rem jurisdiction remains intact.
This category of claim is not any less an assertion of jurisdiction over a
property owner. The Court, while recognizing that there were differ-
ent types of in rem jurisdiction, refused to limit its analysis to quasi in
rem claims.""7 Instead Shaffer holds that "all assertions" of jurisdiction
"must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny."' Most circuit courts adhere to the broad
interpretation of Shaffer's holding."
The Court confirmed its broad intentions by describing how the
minimum contacts standard should be applied to "true" in rem claims.
In such cases, the defendant's claim to property in the forum would
likely qualify as purposeful availment and thus provide the necessary
contacts.'0 The Supreme Court qualified this statement, however, stat-
ing that "in some circumstances, presence of property in the forum
State will not support [this] inference."'1 ' The Court's suggestion that
property ownership in some cases might not establish minimum con-
tacts goes against the claim that "true" in rem assertions are per se
valid. 2 This suggestion leads to the conclusion that there are instances
105 See 15 Usc § 1125(d)(2).
106 See Shaffer, 433 US at 212 (announcing that it is a "fiction" to hold that "an assertion of
jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the prop-
erty").
107 See id at 207 (analyzing the impact of the minimum contacts standard on "true" in rem
and type I quasi in rem proceedings).
10s Id at 212.
109 See note 92.
110 See Shaffer, 433 US at 208 n 25.
111 Id ("In some circumstances the presence of property in the forum State will not support
the inference suggested in text.").
112 For a counterargument, see David F. Fanning, Note, Quasi In Rem On the Cyberseas, 76
Chi-Kent L Rev 1887, 1919 (2001) (arguing that Shaffer's language "suggests a per se rule that
supports quasi in rem jurisdiction wherever there is some conceivable relation between property
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in which courts cannot exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the defen-
dant's property within the forum state-even when that property is re-
lated to the cause of action (an assertion of in rem jurisdiction). Juris-
diction in these cases no longer depends on the location of property in
the forum but instead on the amount of contacts between defendant
property owners and the forum.
In subsequent decisions, the Court has reaffirmed the applicabil-
ity of minimum contacts analysis to all in rem claims. In Burnham v
Superior Court of California, '3 Justice Scalia restated Shaffer's dictate
that "all assertions" of jurisdiction be judged by International Shoe:
"[Shaffer] places all suits against absent nonresidents on the same
constitutional footing, regardless of whether a separate Latin label is
attached to one particular basis of contact."114 Some commentators ar-
gue that Justice Scalia left room for the traditional exercise of in rem
jurisdiction, however, when he stated that "Shaffer... stands for noth-
ing more than the proposition that when the 'minimum contact' that is
a substitute for physical presence consists of property ownership it
must, like other minimum contacts, be related to the litigation."'. This
statement merely confirms, however, Shaffer's analysis that in true in
rem cases property ownership will usually supply the necessary mini-
mum contacts.
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in Burnham, also af-
firmed International Shoe's application to "all rules of jurisdiction.''..
He reasserted even more strongly Shaffer's broad application: "While
our holding in Shaffer may have been limited to quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion, our mode of analysis was not.""
Because plaintiffs filing in rem actions must demonstrate mini-
mum contacts, the ACPA's in rem provision is nullified. Under the Act,
plaintiffs may only bring in rem claims when they are unable to bring
an in personam suit."' Shaffer mandates, however, that the same
minimum contacts standard applies to both in personam and in rem
actions. If Shaffer is to be satisfied, there are no instances in which a
plaintiff could bring an in rem claim under the ACPA. To the extent
of a certain nature and the subject matter of the cause of action").
113 495 US 604 (1990).
114 Id at 621.
115 Id at 620. For the argument that this passage indicates that the traditional exercise of in
rem jurisdiction is preserved, see Lee, 75 Wash L Rev at 139 (cited in note 22) ("Justice Scalia's
opinion in Burnham seemed to go out of its way to leave room under Shaffer for the traditional
exercise of true in rem jurisdiction").
116 495 US at 630 (Brennan concurring) (noting that "the critical insight of Shaffer is that all
rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of due process").
117 Id. In Quill Corporation v North Dakota, 504 US 298, 307 (1992), the Court voiced its
agreement with Justice Brennan in finding that Shaffer extended minimum contacts analysis "to
in rem jurisdiction."
118 See 15 USC § 1125(d)(a).
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that the Act's in rem provision authorizes in rem actions when mini-
mum contacts do not exist, the provision is also unconstitutional."'
This provision should be severable, however, from the rest of the
ACPA. If a statute lacks a severability or nonseverability clause to
provide guidance, courts presume a statutory provision to be sever-
able unless: (1) the remaining portion of the statute is not a fully op-
erative law; or (2) it is evident that the legislature would not have en-
acted the statute without the offending provision."" Under this stan-
dard, the in rem provision is severable. The remaining provisions of
the ACPA authorizing in personam actions would continue to operate
as a fully functioning law. There is also no reason to presume that
Congress, which sought to provide all possible forms of relief to mark
owners,2t' would not wish to preserve the right of plaintiffs to file in
personam claims.
C. Mere Registration Does Not Establish Minimum Contacts
Mark owners must seek relief through ACPA in personam claims.
Plaintiffs face a difficult challenge when confronting foreign cyber-
squatters who merely registered domain names, and who have not yet
engaged in extortion. These defendants' only contact with the United
States may be the registration of the trademark-infringing domain
name. Most courts hold that mere registration with a forum domain
authority, however, does not establish minimum contacts.' In America
119 For a general discussion of this issue, see Cable News Network LP, LLLP v
CNNew&scorn, 162 F Supp 2d 484,491 n 21 (E D Va 2001); Eugene R Quinn, Jr, The Evolution of
Internet Jurisdiction: What a Long Strange Trip It Has Been, 2000 Syracuse L & Tech J 1, 53.
120 Alaska Airlines v Brock, 480 US 678, 684 (1987) ("Unless it is evident that the Legisla-
ture would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that
which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.") (citations
omitted).
121 See generally The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act Report, S Rep No 106-
140,106th ong, 1st Sess 7-8,10-11 (1991).
122 See Cable News Network LP, LLLP v CNNew&com, 162 F Supp 2d 484,489 n 16 (E D
Va 2001) (noting that "[i]t is sensibly settled that these contacts do not provide a constitutionally
adequate basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction"); America Onlin4 Inc v Huang, 106 F
Supp 2d 848, 866 (E D Va 2000) (holding that entrance into domain name registration agree-
ments with a Virginia registrar are not sufficient contacts with Virginia for purposes of exercising
in personam jurisdiction); Banco Inverla4 SA v Inverlatcom, 112 F Supp 2d 521,522 n 1 (E D Va
2000) (holding that mere registration of a disputed domain name with NSI in Virginia is insuffi-
cient to subject a defendant to in personam jurisdiction); Heathmount AE Corp v Tech-
nodome-com, 106 F Supp 2d 860, 866 (E D Va 2000) (emphasizing that defendants do not pur-
posefully avail themselves of the forum through mere registration). Only a small number of
courts find that registration alone satisfies minimum contacts requirements. See Caesars World,
Inc v Caesars-Palaccom (1), 112 F Supp 2d 502, 504 (E D Va 2000) ("To the extent that mini-
mum contacts are required for in rem jurisdiction under Shaffer, ... the fact of domain name reg-
istration with Network Solutions, Inc., in Virginia supplies that"); Lucent Technologies v. Lu-
centsuckll com, 95 F Supp 2d 528,535 n 5 (E D Va 2000) (holding that registration of a domain
name with NSI in Virginia was a minimum contact sufficient to support in personam jurisdiction
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Online v Huang,n the court emphasized that a contract between the
registrant and the domain authority establishes no connection be-
tween the defendant and the forum.'4 Even more importantly, defen-
dants often may not even know where the domain authority with
which they are registering is located.2 The analysis of America Online
and other courts can be confirmed through a close examination of
Shaffer and the domain name registration process.
1. Ownership of property in the forum does not guarantee
minimum contacts.
In most cases, property ownership suggests that the owner in-
tends to benefit from the protection of the state's laws.'26 The Supreme
Court in Shaffer explicitly acknowledged that this might not always be
the case.n The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts provides that a state
will not normally exercise in rem jurisdiction over property that has
been brought into the state by way of fraud or without the owner's
consent.' 8 In such circumstances, there is no purposeful availment.
Owners do not purposefully seek to benefit from the forum since they
may not even be aware that their property has passed into the state.
This analysis suggests that courts may not presume that domain name
registrants have minimum contacts with the forum merely because
they own property (the domain name) that is "housed" in the forum
state. Courts must ask whether registration of a domain name in the
forum indicates purposeful availment or whether the situation of reg-
istrants is more analogous to that of the property owners discussed in
Section 60 of the Restatement.
over the defendant). None of these courts devotes much analysis to the issue beyond the claim
that registration puts defendants on notice that they are subject to jurisdiction in that forum. See,
for example, Lucent, 95 F Supp 2d at 535 n 5.
123 106 F Supp 2d 848 (E D Va 2000).
124 See id at 856 ("[N]either the circumstances of the contracts' execution or negotiation,
nor the relationship of the contracts to the forum state are sufficient to establish personal juris-
diction over eAsia.").
125 See id at 857 (writing that the defendant might not have known because "corporations
routinely operate in many different states, yet choose one state in which to litigate claims arising
from its contracts").
126 See Shaffer, 433 US at 208.
127 See id at 208 n 25 ("In some circumstances, the presence of property in the forum State
will not support the inference [of purposeful availment] suggested in text."), citing Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts § 60 comments c, d (1971).
128 See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 60 comments c, d (cited in note 127).
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2. Registration does not satisfy the purposeful
availment standard.
Cybersquatters do not purposefully avail themselves of the bene-
fits of state laws by the mere fact that their domain name information
is stored at a registry in the forum. For example, Internet users regis-
tering domain names with Verisign are never directly informed where
their domain names are "housed" or even where the corporation is lo-
cated.' Even registrants who search the site to discover with whom
they are contracting and where that party is located will most likely be
led astray. The title and graphics of the website's main page indicate
that it is maintained and run by Verisign."' Registrants must inde-
pendently click on the site's contact information page to discover that
Verisign's headquarters is in California.'1 They must also click on the
privacy agreement to find that the office of NSI's general counsel is in
Virginia.'3 Neither page, however, indicates whether the domain name
is "housed" at either of the two locations. It is difficult to see how reg-
istrants purposefully avail themselves of the protection of Virginia's or
California's laws if they cannot discover where their property is
stored.
This is even more evident when the defendant registers with a
registrar other than Verisign. For example, if an individual registers
with Alldomains.com, a California-based registrar, his sole point of
contact during registration is with that company.'3 His domain name
will likely still be "housed," however, with Verisign since it is the ex-
clusive registry for ".com" addresses.'33 Under the ACPA, a plaintiff
may bring an in rem action in the forum in which the registrar or reg-
istry is located.'3 Thus the ACPA presumes that the registrant above
would have established minimum contacts with both California and
129 See Verisign Domain Name Registration Information, available online at
<http://vww.netsol.com> (visited May 7, 2002). Users must independently click links off of
Verisign's main page in order to determine where that company and NSI are located. See
Verisign Main Page, available online at <http://www.verisign.com> (visited May 7, 2002); Verisign
Contact Information, available online at < http://www.verisign.comlcorporate/aboutlcontactl>
(visited May 7, 2002) (indicating that Verisign's headquarters is in California); Verisign Privacy
Agreement, available online at <http//vwwv.netsol.com/en-US/legal/privacy-policy.jhtml> (vis-
ited May 7,2002) (indicating that NSI is based in Virginia).
130 Verisign Domain Name Registration Information, available online at <http://
www.netsol.comen-US/index.jhtml?requestid=3863854> (visited May 7,2002).
131 See Verisign Contact Information, available online at <http://www.netsol.comlenUS!
contactus.jhtml> (visited on May 7,2002).
132 See Verisign Privacy Agreement129, available online at <http:llwww.netsol.comlen_US/
lega/privacy-policy.jhtml> (visited May 7,2002).
133 See Alldomains.com Domain Name Registration Information, available online at
<http.//www.alldomains.com> (visited May 7,2002).
134 See Verisign Corporation Information, available online at <http://www.verisigngrs.com/
aboutus!> (visited on May 7,2002).
135 See 15 USC § 1125(d)(2)(A).
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Virginia, even though the only party with which he communicated was
Alldomains.com, based in California.'
The situation of domain registrants parallels that of the property
owners discussed in the Restatement.'" In both cases, property enters
into a state without the owners' knowledge. The owners in the Re-
statement are unaware where their property is located because they
have been defrauded or otherwise failed to give consent to the move-
ment of their property. A registrant who registers with a registrar, say
Alldomains.com, may similarly believe that his domain name is lo-
cated in one state (California) when in reality it has been transferred
to a registry in another state (Virginia). The same holds true for a reg-
istrant who registers with California-based Verisign but does not spe-
cifically consent to have his property stored in a registry in Virginia.
Assertion of jurisdiction merely because a forum registry maintains
registration certificates of the domain name violates the owner's rights
to fair play and substantial justice.'"
3. Cybersquatters do not establish substantive connections with
the forum through registration.
The act of registration is also insufficient to establish minimum
contacts with the forum. Registration is accomplished through a single
exchange over the Internet lasting for only a few minutes. ' A single
contract between a defendant and a forum resident, however, may es-
tablish minimum contacts.4 The contract, however, must have a "sub-
stantial connection" with the forum.' In determining whether the
contract satisfies this standard, courts look to the prior negotiations
and future duties of the parties to determine whether the defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts with that forum. 1
2
136 See Alldomains.com Contact Information, available online at <http://
www.alldomains.com/contact.html> (visited May 7,2002) (listing Concord, CA as the company's
mailing address).
137 See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, § 60 comments c, d.
138 See Porsche Cars North America, Inc v Porsch.com, 51 F Supp 2d 707, 712-13 (E D Va
1999) (holding that "by validating an in rem proceeding that would cancel or reassign certain
domain names, merely because NSI maintains the underlying registration certificates within this
district [and] without regard to the interests of those who registered them ... might violate due
process"), vacd on other grounds and remd, 215 F3d 1320 (4th Cir 2000).
139 See Verisign Domain Name Registration Information, available online at <http://
www.netsol.com/enUS/index.jhtml> (visited May 7,2002) (displaying the interface by which us-
ers may begin to register a domain name).
140 See McGee v International Life Insurance Co, 355 US 220,223 (1957) (finding that a sin-
gle contract, entered into by mail with a forum state resident, may satisfy minimum contacts for a
suit for a claim arising from the contract).
141- Id.
142 See Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462,479 (1985) ("It is these factors-prior
negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the
parties' actual course of dealing-that must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant
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The contract between registrants and registrars fails this standard.
The process of registration and the duties imposed by the contract do
not give rise to any substantive connection between the forum and
registrant. Registration is brief, performed over the Internet, and does
not involve negotiation of terms. Neither registrars nor registries per-
form any substantial services in the forum as a result of the contract.
The only lasting connection between the registrant and the forum is
the $30 to $35 annual maintenance fee paid to the registry by credit
card over the Internet. These payments do not create an ongoing
business relationship between the registrant and registrar "any more
than a magazine subscription creates an ongoing relationship between
the publisher and subscriber."'"
Mark owners will thus be unable to obtain relief through the
ACPA's in rem provision. The difficulties facing mark owners can best
be seen through the hypothetical described in the Introduction. The
ACPA requires Intel to bring its in rem claim against "pentium3.com"
in Virginia where Verisign, the domain name authority, is located. As
dictated by Shaffer, however, Intel must establish minimum contacts
between Blofeld and Virginia. Because Intel must demonstrate mini-
mum contacts, it will be unable to bring an in rem claim under the
ACPA. Finally, Intel will be unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction
over Blofeld in Virginia by simply pointing to his registration with
Verisign.
Im. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Because in rem claims must pass the International Shoe minimum
contacts standard, plaintiffs will be unable to bring in rem actions un-
der the ACPA."' Mark owners will also face possible difficulty in ob-
taining in personam jurisdiction over foreign cybersquatters who reg-
ister an infringing domain name but who do not attempt directly to
extort the mark owner.
Mark owners may file in personam claims against these cyberpi-
rates by employing the "effects" doctrine and Rule 4(k)(2).1" Part A
purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum.').
143 See America Online, 106 F Supp 2d at 855 n 21 (stating that NSI, a predecessor of
Verisign, only had to maintain the defendant registrant's second level domain server information
in its database).
144 Id at 857.
145 See Part H.B.
146 While no court has employed the "effects" doctrine and Rule 4(k)(2) in combination,
their use together presents no theoretical problem. The "effects" doctrine demonstrates an in-
stance in which a defendant establishes minimum contacts. See Part I.CA. Rule 4(k)(2) permits
the aggregation of such contacts to determine whether the defendant has minimum contacts with
the nation as whole. See Part I.C.5. Thus, the former shows when a defendant has minimum con-
tacts and the latter allows federal courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a defendant on
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demonstrates how under the "effects" doctrine, plaintiffs may demon-
strate that cybersquatters establish contacts with the nation as whole
when they register with a forum and when the harmful effect of that
registration is felt by United States businesses.47 Part B suggests that
federal courts may, under Rule 4(k)(2), use these nationwide contacts
as a basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction over the defendants.
'4
Part C concludes by finding that this exercise of jurisdiction also satis-
fies traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
A. Cybersquatters Establish Minimum Contacts by Targeting United
States Businesses
Under the effects doctrine of Calder, a defendant may establish
minimum contacts if he: (1) commits intentional actions expressly
aimed at the forum; and (2) those actions cause harm (a) that is felt
primarily in the forum and (b) that the defendant knows will be felt
there. Courts have employed this test to obtain in personam jurisdic-
tion over cybersquatters attempting to extort money from forum state
businesses.' They should equally be able to use the doctrine to exer-
cise jurisdiction over defendants who register domain names with the
bad faith intent to attract the mark owner's customers or with the
purpose of disparaging the mark. These cybersquatters intentionally
target U.S. mark owners and are aware that the owners will suffer
harm in the United States."0
Foreign cybersquatters satisfy the first prong of the test by ex-
pressly targeting American businesses. In Panavision, the court held
that this prong of the effects test was satisfied when the defendant at-
tempted to extort money from a California business.15' Since the de-
fendant targeted a business he knew to be located in the California fo-
the basis of those contacts.
147 See Part I.C.4.
148 See Part I.C.5.
149 See text accompanying notes 74-83.
150 While the "effects" doctrine has not previously been used to establish a defendant's con-
tacts with the nation as a whole, courts have recognized the validity of asserting personal juris-
diction based on nationwide contacts. See notes 84-89. Also, when federal courts entertain fed-
eral claims, such as those actions filed under the ACPA, they look to the defendant's contacts
with the United States. See United Rope Distributors Inc v Seatriumph Marine Corp, 930 F2d
532, 534 (7th Cir 1991) (holding that when federal courts apply federal law, due process clause
requirements are satisfied so long as the defendant possesses sufficient contacts with the United
States). A court entertaining an ACPA in personam action will thus assess a cybersquatter's con-
tacts throughout the United States. The effects doctrine may then be used to show that foreign
cybersquatters establish nationwide contacts when they register protected marks and cause in-
jury to U.S. mark owners.
151 See Panavision, 141 F3d at 1322 (holding that personal jurisdiction was properly exer-
cised over defendant where a website was obtained by defendant "for the purpose of extorting
money from Panavision"). See also text accompanying notes 74-79.
[69:18371860
In Personam Jurisdiction over Cybersquatters
rum, the court interpreted his actions to be aimed intentionally at the
forum." In the same way, foreign cybersquatters target the nation as a
whole by seeking to profit unfairly from or disparage protected marks.
They are aware that marks such as "Pentium" are controlled by
American businesses. They directly target American mark owners and
seek to confuse American, as well as worldwide, Internet users into
believing that the cybersquatter sites are affiliated with the mark
owner.
The second prong of the test is first satisfied because plaintiffs
suffer immediate injury from the unlawful registration and use of their
marks as domain names. Registration prevents a business from using
the domain name itself in order to channel consumers to its own web-
site.' Internet traffic seeking the business's site is redirected to sites
established by the cybersquatter. Not only do these businesses lose
contact with potential customers, but also the value of their marks is
diminished."' Significantly, Congress recognized this harm by creating
a cause of action for the mark owner under the ACPA.
The second prong is also satisfied because foreign cybersquatters
recognize that when they tarnish the good will of the mark, the harm
they inflict is felt in the United States. These cyberpirates differ, how-
ever, from the defendant in Panavision who established minimum con-
tacts with California when he attempted to extort money from a Cali-
fornia-based company."' Foreign cybersquatters who register infring-
ing domain names with the intent to confuse consumers likely will not
establish minimum contacts with the state in which the mark owner
suffers the harm. The difference between these two is demonstrated
by analysis under the second prong of the "effects" doctrine. In Panav-
ision, the plaintiff could easily demonstrate that the cybersquatter
knew that the harm would be suffered in California because the cy-
bersquatter mailed letters demanding money to the business in Cali-
fornia, ' , The plaintiff facing a cyberpirate who does not engage in ex-
tortion, however, may find it difficult to show that the defendant was
aware of the particular state in which the harm would be felt. He will
find it much easier to prove that the defendant was aware more
broadly that the harm would be felt in the United States.
152 See Panavision, 141 F3d at 1322.
153 See Porsche Cars North America, Inc v Porsch.com, 51 F Supp 2d 707,710 (E D Va 1999)
(holding that "the mere act of registration creates an immediate injury by preventing Porsche
from utilizing those domain names itself"). See generally S Rep No 106-140 at 4-5 (cited in note
1).
154 See Porsche, 51 F Supp 2d at 710 (holding that harm occurs when consumers reach a
"dead end" because this will cause them to assume that "the strength of Porsche's brand name is
not as great as they first thought").
155 See Panavision, 141 F3d at 1322.
156 See id at 1319.
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For example, when an individual registers "delta-airlines.com," he
might not be expected to know that Delta Airlines's injury would be
suffered at its headquarters in Georgia. He most assuredly knows,
however, that this American business would feel economic losses
within the United States. Since cybersquatters are expressly aware of
these harmful effects, they should "reasonably anticipate being haled
into court" in this country to answer for their misconduct. "
Unfortunately, cybersquatters registering the protected marks of
foreign companies may escape this analysis. The harm felt by a small,
independent company operating solely in Europe does not establish
contacts between the cybersquatter and the United States. Larger in-
ternational corporations with offices and regional headquarters in the
United States, however, will feel losses in this country. For example, a
cybersquatter registering "toyota.com" might reasonably expect that
this will cause Toyota to suffer harm in the United States. In any event,
the ACPA's legislative history indicates that Congress was most con-
cerned with protecting United States businesses and United States
trademarks."-
B. Courts Using Rule 4(k)(2) May Aggregate a Cybersquatter's
Contacts with the Nation as a Whole
Rule 4(k)(2) is used for claims arising under federal statutes that
lack service of process provisions. 9 The ACPA does not contain a ser-
vice provision for in personam claims.6 Plaintiffs may thus rely on
Rule 4(k)(2) to obtain jurisdiction over foreign defendants. The rule
permits courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a defendant
where (1) a federal claim is asserted, (2) the defendant has contacts
with the nation as a whole, and (3) the defendant is shown not to be
subject to personal jurisdiction in any state.
'
6
157 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286,297 (1980).
158 See generally Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act, HR Rep No 106412 at 6, 14
(cited in note 2) (defining cybersquatting as the registration of a domain name that "infringes
upon a U.S. trademark" and also stating that the real danger presented by cybersquatters is that
they "destroy the value of brand-names and trademarks of American businesses").
159 See notes 84-90 and accompanying text; Kelleher, 12 Touro L Rev at 34 (cited in note
64) (stating that Rule 4(k)(2) "is intended to plug a gap in enforcement of federal law by ex-
panding the jurisdiction of the federal courts in federal cases involving non-resident defen-
dants").
160 For an explanation of the service of process provisions, see text accompanying notes 89-
90.
161 See United States v Swiss American Bank, 191 F3d 30,38 (1st Cir 1999) (stating the con-
ditions for an assertion of jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2)). Rule 4(k)(2) also permits plaintiffs to
bring their claims in any federal court. Mark owners facing foreign defendants thus will no
longer have to bring suit in the forum in which the domain name authority is located to file their
claims.
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The applicability of the rule to the problem created by overseas
cybersquatting is clear. The ACPA is a federal statute and therefore
satisfies Rule 4(k)(2)'s first requirement.' 2 Furthermore, cybersquat-
ters establish nationwide contacts in the United States by inflicting fi-
nancial harm on American businesses."3 Finally, foreign defendants are
not subject to in personam jurisdiction in any state court. These cyber-
squatters have only two contacts with the United States: registration
of the domain name and the harmful effect they inflict on mark own-
ers. Neither of these contacts provides sufficient basis for the exercise
of in personam jurisdiction in a state court (unless the plaintiff can
show cybersquatters knew the location of the company's headquar-
ters). The state in which the domain name authority is located cannot
assert jurisdiction when the defendant's only contact with the state is
the act of registration.' As noted earlier, plaintiffs facing cybersquat-
ters who fail to engage in extortion will likely be unable to use the "ef-
fects" doctrine to establish jurisdiction in the state in which the harm
is felt. To apply the "effects" doctrine successfully in such a case, the
plaintiff would have to show that the cybersquatter was expressly tar-
geting the forum state and that he realized that mark owner would
suffer harm in that state.6 Most plaintiffs will be unable to meet this
difficult burden. As noted above, however, they will find it relatively
easy to show that the cybersquatter was aware that the mark-owning
company was based in the United States.'66
C. Exercise of Jurisdiction Is Reasonable
Because cybersquatters purposefully direct their activities at
United States residents, courts may presume that the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction is reasonable.'67 Federal courts have a "manifest
interest" in providing residents with a convenient forum for redressing
injuries inflicted by foreign actors.", In Calder, the Supreme Court
162 See 15 USCS § 1125(d).
163 See text accompanying notes 155-58.
164 See Part III.B.
165 In the example described in Part III.A, a Georgia court would only be able to exercise
jurisdiction if Delta Airlines demonstrated that the defendant registering "delta-airlines.con"
expressly targeted Georgia and realized that the harm suffered by the airline would be centered
in that state.
166 If the defendant is aware of the connection between the mark owner and the forum
state, a plaintiff may not have to use Rule 4(k)(2). Assuming that the plaintiff could show that
the defendant purposefully directed harm into the state where the plaintiff's headquarters is lo-
cated, the plaintiff could bring an in personam action in that state. The court would then assert
jurisdiction through the "effects" doctrine.
167 See Part HI.A.
168 See generally Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462 (noting the reasons a court
may assert jurisdiction over an individual who "purposefully directs" his activities toward forum
residents).
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stressed the inequity of requiring the victims of tortious conduct to
seek redress outside the forum.'69 Defendants should not be able to in-
flict harmful effects on forum residents and then claim that the fo-
rum's exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable.
While there is a presumption that the assertion of jurisdiction
over a foreign cybersquatter is reasonable, the Supreme Court in
Asahi suggested that the issue of reasonableness must be more closely
examined when foreign parties are involved. 0 Asahi may clearly be
distinguished, however, from actions against alien cybersquatters.
Asahi involved a claim between two foreign parties that arose from an
overseas transaction. 7' In cases of cybersquatting, however, foreign de-
fendants intentionally inflict injury on American mark owners in the
United States. The Court surely did not intend Asahi to block United
States citizens from obtaining remedies for harms suffered in this
country."
By returning to the "pentium3.com" hypothetical described ear-
lier, one can see how mark owners facing foreign cybersquatters may
successfully obtain relief through the "effects" doctrine and Rule
4(k)(2). Intel may demonstrate through the "effects" doctrine that
Blofeld established nationwide contacts. Intel can easily prove that,
when Blofeld registered "pentium3.com" and set up a website to at-
tract Internet users, he knowingly targeted Intel in the United States
and understood that the company would suffer harm in this country. A
federal court may then employ Rule 4(k)(2) to exercise in personam
jurisdiction over Blofeld. The first two requirements of the rule are
satisfied since Intel is asserting a federal claim under the ACPA and
Blofeld has nationwide contacts. The final requirement is also satisfied
since Blofeld is not likely to be subject to jurisdiction in any one state.
Blofeld's only contact in the United States, aside from the harm suf-
fered by Intel, is his registration of the domain name with Verisign in
Virginia. Blofeld also is likely unaware that the harm he inflicted on
Intel may be centered in its principal place of business in California."*
Because neither California nor Virginia may assert jurisdiction on the
basis of these contacts, a federal court may assert jurisdiction over
169 See Calder, 465 US at 790 (emphasizing that "[a]n individual injured in California need
not go to Florida to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly
cause[d] the injury in California").
170 See 480 US at 116 (finding that an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant
was "unreasonable," even if the defendant had minimum contacts with the forum state).
171 See id at 105-06 (noting that the parties before the court were from Taiwan and Japan).
172 See id at 114 (noting that Asahi's contacts with the forum were insufficient because the
indemnification took place in Taiwan and the goods were shipped from Japan to Taiwan).
173 Of course, if Blofeld is aware that his acts will cause harm in a particular state, a court in
that state may assert jurisdiction though the "effects" doctrine alone, without resort to Rule
4(k)(2).
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Blofeld through Rule 4(k)(2).74 Finally, since Blofeld intentionally in-
flicted harm on a United States resident, there is a strong presumption
that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Foreign cybersquatters inflict substantial economic losses on
American businesses. Their substantive contacts with the United
States almost always appear limited to registration of the offending
domain address. Mark owners will likely be unable to obtain jurisdic-
tion over these domain names. The Supreme Court in Shaffer man-
dated that minimum contacts analysis apply to all assertions of juris-
diction. This ruling renders the ACPA's in rem provision null and void.
Mark owners also cannot show that cybersquatters are subject to in
personam jurisdiction based solely on registration of the domain
names. Registrants do not purposefully avail themselves of the bene-
fits and protections of the forum since they are often unaware of the
state in which the registry or registrar is located.
Mark owners may still seek relief through claims filed directly
against alien cybersquatters. Courts may use the "effects" doctrine and
Rule 4(k)(2) to exercise in personam jurisdiction over these defen-
dants. The "effects" doctrine shows that cybersquatters establish con-
tacts with the nation as whole by deliberately inflicting injury on mark
owners in the United States. Under Rule 4(k)(2), courts may exercise
jurisdiction on the basis of these nationwide contacts since plaintiffs
are filing federal claims under the ACPA and the defendants are not
subject to jurisdiction in any one state.
174 See Part III.B.
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